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COMMENTS
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-PATENTS-EFFECT OF SECTION 271
ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT-Prior to 1952

the judiciary had sole control of questions involving the infringe-
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ment of patents. The courts evolved their own concepts and rules
of interpretation without legislative guidance. The Patent Act
of 1952 marked a radical departure from this policy. Section 271
of the new patent act is an attempt on the part of Congress to codify
the doctrine of contributory infringement.1 Prior to the enactment of this section there was considerable doubt as to the scope
of this doctrine and even as to its continued existence. Supreme
Court recognition of the defense of patent misuse appears to have
diluted the effectiveness of the contributory infringement suit in a
number of different situations. Whether section 271 has altered
the rights of patentees is an important and unsolved problem.
While legislative history abounds with statements that the new
provisions do not alter earlier rules,2 there is a noticeable trend in
recent judicial evaluations of section 271 to treat it as making
substantial revisions in the law. These decisions raise questions as
to the scope of the present doctrine of contributory infringement
and patent misuse. It is the purpose of this comment to evaluate
the rights of the patentee in the light of these decisions. A thorough
knowledge of the judicial doctrines of contributory infringement
and patent misuse is a prerequisite to an understanding of the
present position of the patentee. Therefore the first section of this
comment is devoted to a review of the important principles which
were developed in the decisions before 1952.
35 U.S.C. (1952) §271 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension
of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived
revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform
acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement.
2 The Judiciary Committee of the House stated in its Report on §271, "The major
changes or innovations in this title consist of incorporating a requirement for invention in
§103 and the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in §271." H. Rep. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d sess., 5 (1952) (emphasis supplied). The Report also states at 9, "Considerable
doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory infringement has resulted from a
number of decisions of the courts in recent years. The purpose of this section is to codify
in statutory form principles of contributory infringement and at the same time eliminate
this doubt and confusion."
1
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The Judicial Doctrines of Contributory Infringement
and Patent Misuse

Direct infringement of a patent occurs when a person makes,
vends, or uses a patented invention without the authorization of
the patentee.3 In direct infringement actions inquiry is principally
directed to the question of whether the defendant has accomplished
the same result as that contemplated by the patentee, by substantially the same means as those specified in the patent claim. This is
particularly true in cases involving a patent on a novel combination of unpatentable elements. The manufacture, sale, or use of
an element of a patented combination or of any number of such
elements in a combination different from that recited in the patent
claim is not direct infringement.4 To give a patentee more effective protection, the American courts developed the doctrine of
contributory infringement. Under this doctrine, anyone who
supplied parts of a combination to a direct infringer,5 or who induced another to infringe directly, 6 is liable as a contributory inGeorge Close Co. v. Ideal Wrapping Machine Co., (1st Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 533.
A claim is not infringed by use of less than the entire combination. Burdett v.
Estey, (2d Cir. 1879) 16 Blatch. 105; Sharp v. Tifft, (2d Cir. 1880) 18 Blatch. 132; Vance
v. Campbell, 66 U.S. 427 (1861); Prouty v. Draper Ruggles & Co., 41 U.S. 335 (1841);
Band-it Co. v. McAneny, (10th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 766. See Wiles, "Joint Trespasses
on Patent Property," 30 A.B.A.J. 454 (1944).
5 Wallace v. Holmes, (C.C. Conn. 1871) 29 Fed. Gas. 74, No. 17,100; Schneider v.
Pountney, (C.C. N.J. 1884) 21 F. 399; Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., (6th
Cir. 1897) 80 F. 712. See Roberts, "Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights," 12 HAR.v.
L. REv. 35 (1898). The first case to use the term "contributory infringement" was Snyder
v. Bunnell, (S.D. N.Y. 1886) 29 F. 47. There can be no contributory infringement unless
there is direct infringement. Sutton v. Gulf Smokeless Coal Co., (4th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d)
439, cert. den. 280 U.S. 609 (1930); Fehr v. Activated Sludge, Inc., (7th Cir. 1936) 84 F.
(2d) 948. A presumption that materials have been used in an infringing manner arises
if they were furnished with an intent that they be used in such a manner. American
Stainless Steel v. Ludlum Steel Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 823. This presumption
is rebuttable, and may amount only to a permissive inference in the absence of other evidence. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Ruth, (10th Cir. 1936) 87 F. (2d) 35.
6 A wide number of activities may be described as inducing infringement. E.g., Graham
v. Earl, (9th Cir. 1897) 92 F. 155 (leasing machinery to be used in infringing a patent);
Toppan v. Tiffany Refrigerator Car Co., (N.D. Ill. 1889) 39 F. 420 (furnishing expert
advice on constructing infringing machinery); Conmar Products Corp. v. Tibony, (E.D. N.Y.
1945) 63 F. Supp. 372 (building and selling machinery to be used in infringing); American
Tel. & Tel. v. Radio Audion Co., (D.C. Del. 1922) 281 F. 200, affd. (3d Cir. 1922) 284 F. 1020
(ordering goods from a manufacturer which can only be produced by infringing a patented
process belonging to a third manufacturer); Ames Safety Envelope Co. v. Randell, (D.C.
Mass. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 613 (lending money to a direct infringer with intent to aid him in
infringing); Trent v. Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works, (9th Cir. 1900) 102 F. 635
(supervising the building of an infringing structure). The most common type of inducement is selling an article to be used in infringement, coupled with instructions which
direct the buyer in infringing the patent. See, e.g., American Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum
Steel Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 823; Imperial Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Stein, (C.C. N.Y.
1895) 69 F. 161, modified (2d Cir. 1896) 77 F. 612 (sale of articles capable of being used in
a non-infringing way); Cugley v. Bundy Incubator Co., (6th Cir. 1937) 93 F. (2d) 932;
3

4
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£ringer. However, this liability will not attach to a supplier of
unpatented elements unless he is shown to intend that the unpatented element be used in infringing the patent.7 _Such intent can
generally be demonstrated by showing that the ele_ment sold is
unsuited for any but infringing uses. 8
The protection afforded the patentee was buttressed, at the
tum of the century, by the fact that most courts would allow a
patentee to dictate the type of supplies that were to be used with
his patented invention.9 Thus in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.}° a
patentee selling its mimeograph machine on the condition that the
ink used in the operation of the machine be purchased from him,
was permitted to enjoin a competitor from supplying ink to purchasers of the mimeograph machine. This broad interpretation of
the rights incident to the patent grant was short-lived. A change
in the personnel of the Supreme Court and a growing awareness
of the monopolistic abuses of the tying clause led to a sweeping
revision of this doctrine. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. UniMetallizing Engineering Co. v. Metallizing Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 274 (sale of
articles capable of use only in infringing manner).
7 Chas. H. Lilly Co. v. I. F. Laucks, Inc., (9th Cir. 1933) 68 F. (2d) 175, cert. den. 293
U.S. 573 (1934); Rumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chemical Co., (C.C. N.J. 1906)
148 F. 862, affd. (3d Cir. 1907) 154 F. 65, cert. den. 207 U.S. 592 (1907).
s New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, (8th Cir. 1915) 224 F. 452, cert. den. 239 U.S.
640 (1915); Canada v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., (6th Cir. 1903) 128 F. 486; American
Gramophone Co. v. Hawthorne, (C.C. Pa. 1899) 92 F. 516. An action for contributory infringement will not lie unless it is shown that the unpatented article being sold by the
defendant is not capable of any other use. Saxe v. Hammond, (C.C. Mass. 1875) 21 Fed.
Cas. 593, No. 12,411;) Snyder ·v. Bunnell, (C.C. N.Y. 1886) 29 F. 47; Millner v. Schofield,
(C.C. Va. 1881) 17 Fed. Cas. 392, No. 9609a. Contra, Sandusky Foundry & Mach. Co. v.
DeLavaud, (6th Cir. 1921) 274 F. 607; Young Radiator Co. v. Modine Mfg. Co., (7th Cir.
1931) 55 F. (2d) 545. Where intent was shown by the directions to use the product in an
infringing manner, an action for contributory infringement would lie even though the
article sold was capable of non-infringing uses. American Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum
Steel Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 923; Imperial Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Stein, (C.C. N.Y.
1895) 69 F. 616, modified (2d Cir. 1896) 77 F. 612.
9 During this period a patentee was legally entitled to insist that all supplies used in a
patented machine are purchased from him. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co., (6th Cir. 1896) 77 F. 288; Tubular Rivet and Stud Co. v. O'Brien,
(C.C. Mass. 1898) 93 F. 200; Rupp & Wittgenfeld v. Elliott, (6th Cir. 1904) 131 F. 730;
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., (2d Cir. 1907) 154 F. 58; Aeolian Co. v.
Juelg Co., (2d Cir. 1907) 155 F. 119; A.B. Dick Co. v. Milwaukee Office Specialty Co., (C.C.
Wis. 1908) 168 F. 930; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., (C.C. N.Y.
1909) 172 F. 225; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Standard Brewery, (C.C. Ill. 1909) 174 F. 252;
Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Autolux Co., (C.C. Wis. 1910) 181 F. 387; Rajah Auto Supply
Co. v. Rex Ignition Mfg. Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1913) 209 F. 622. Contra, Cortelyou v. Johnson
& Co., (2d Cir. 1906) 145 F. 933.
10 224 U.S. I (1912). Partially as a result of the Dick decision Congress enacted §3 of
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §14 which condemns exclusive dealing arrangements and tying clauses which may have tendency substantially to lessen competition or create a monopoly.
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versal Film Mfg. Co.,11 the Supreme Court held that a patentee
conditioning licenses upon the purchase of unpatented supplies
from him, was unable to enforce his patent against contributory
infringers. In reaching this conclusion the court did not narrow
the scope of the doctrine of contributory infringement. The
court felt that the patentee was guilty of inequitable conduct in
attempting to restrain commerce in unpatented supplies. Thus
the patentee could be denied an equity remedy because of his own
misconduct, without any reference to what the defendant had done.
This was the first expression by the Supreme Court of the so-called
doctrine of patent misuse. The defense of misuse was extended
by the Supreme Court in Carbice Corp. of America v. American
Patents Development Corp.,12 to embrace cases where the patentee
tried to control competition in the unpatented elements of a combination patent. In the Carbice case, Justice Brandeis, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that the misuse doctrine would bar a
contributory infringement action by a patentee who required
licensees to purchase all elements of the combination patent from
itself. The Carbice doctrine was subsequently held equally applicable to attempts by a patentee to achieve the same result without
an express restriction by means of limiting licenses to those who
purchased components solely from it.13 The misuse doctrine is
not limited to contributory infringement suits. In Morton Salt v.
Suppiger Co., 14 direct infringement actions were barred where the
patentee sought to use his patent as a means to monopolize unpatented goods.15
11243 U.S. 502 (1917). The decision in the Motion Picture Patents Case was not based
on the Clayton Act, but was based solely on the policy of the patent laws. Patent policy
and the antitrust policy, under §3 of the Clayton Act, are differentiated by the fact that a
violation of the Clayton Act occurs only when the restrictive practice may substantially
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488 (1942).
12 283 U.S. 27 (1931). Some authorities would cite the Carbic;e decision as being the
first case to utilize the misuse doctrine. See Rich, "Infringement under Section 271 of the
Patent Act of 1952," 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521 at 529 (1953). However, there would appear
to be very little reason to distinguish the theory of the Carbice case from that stated in the
Motion Picture Patents case. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S.
661 at 668 (1944).
13 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938). The courts also found misuse
where the patentee, while freely licensing all, discriminated in royalty rates between those
who purchased from him and those who purchased from his competitor. Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. LaFera Grecco Constr. Co., (3d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 211; Dehydrators, Ltd. v.
Petrolite Corp., (9th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 183.
14 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
15 A similar view had previously been propounded in American Lecithen Co. v. Warfield Co., (7th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207, cert. den. 308 U.S. 609 (1939); B.B. Chemical Co.
v. Ellis, (1st Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 829 (concurring opinion of Magruder, J.), affd. 314 U.S.
495 (1942).
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While the misuse cases limited the effectiveness of contributory
infringement actions, they in no way tampered with the basic doctrine of contributory infringement.16 Thus it was a great shock
to the patent bar when the Supreme Court suggested in Mercoid v.
Midcontinent Investment Co.17 that the doctrine of contributory
infringement had been whittled down to a mere residuum. In the
Mercoid case, combination patents for domestic heating systems
were sublicensed by an exclusive licensee to those purchasing stoker
switches exclusively from him. These switches could be used only
in the patented invention. Neither the patentee nor the licensee
manufactured or assembled the complete heating unit, and the
patentee's royalties were measured by the number of switches the
licensee sold. The owner of the patent attempted to enjoin
Mercoid from furnishing the stoker switches to direct infringers,
but the Supreme Court denied relief. The precise ground of the
decision was not clearly delimited by the majority opinion of
Justice Douglas. In all probability the decision rested upon the
fact that the patentee was restricting the use of unpatented supplies
to be used in the patented invention. Nevertheless, the opinion
contained dicta which cast doubt on the validity of the whole
doctrine of contributory infringement.18 Viewed in the light
of previous cases, this decision seemed to indicate that a court
would be quick to find misuse of the patent if the patentee made
his profit by selling elements of the patented invention or supplies,
rather than by licensing the patent.19 This interpretation was
bolstered by the fact that the switches could be used only in the
patented invention.20 The effect of the Mercoid decision was to
16 However, the language in the Carbice opinion can be read to state that the doctrine
of contributory infringement had been narrowed to deal only with cases where the defendant sold articles capable of use solely in infringing a patent. Carbice Corp. of America v.
American Patents Dev. Co., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
17 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
18 "Leeds b Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), supra, is authority for
the conclusion that he who sells an unpatented part of a combination patent for use in the
assembled machine may be guilty of contributory infringement. The protection which the
Court in that case extended to the phonograph record, which was an unpatented part of
the patented phonograph, is in substance inconsistent with the view which we have expressed in this case." Douglas, J., in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320
U.S. 661 at 668 (1944).
19 For a similar interpretation of these cases, see American Lecithen Co. v. Warfield
Co., (7th Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207, cert. den. 308 U.S. 522 (1939).
20 Some interpreters felt that the doctrine of misuse as expounded by the Mercoid
decision was applicable only when the patentee was trying to control unpatented articles
capable of substantial non-infringing use (generally referred to as staples). See Diamond,
"The Status of Combination Patents Owned by Sellers of an Element of the Combination,"
21 J. PAT. OFF. S~c. 843 (1939). But there was little support for such a distinction in the
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leave lower courts and members of the patent bar in confusion as
to the status of contributory infringement suits. Indeed, several
lower courts expressed the opinion that Mercoid abolished contributory infringement.21 Most courts, however, though uncertain
of the meaning of Mercoid, continued to entertain contributory
infringement suits.22

II. Scope of the Misuse Doctrine Under Section 271
Paragraph (d) of section 271 provides that a patentee shall not
be guilty of misuse if he does one or more of the following: (1)
derives revenue from acts which if performed by another would
constitute contributory infringement; (2) licenses or authorizes
another to perform acts which if performed without his consent
would constitute contributory infringement; (3) enforces his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
There is at least a possibility that section 271 will result in some
changes in the misuse doctrine. However, the legislative history
of the section and its language do not point out clearly where those
changes might take place. A clearer understanding of the problems inherent in section 271 can be gained by trying to determine
how its provisions would operate in specific factual situations.
Some fact situations and possible problems are presented below.
A. The patentee derives his whole income from licensing the
patent. He sells no component parts of his unpatented combinacases that immediately preceded the Mercoid decision. Cf. Philad. Co. v. Lechler Laboratories, Inc., (2d Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 747; Autographic Register Co. v. Sturgis Register
Co., (6th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 883; B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, (1st Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d)
829, affd. 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
21

Stroco Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, (S.D. Cal. 1944) 67 U.S.P.Q. 168. See also Stokes

&: Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 198; Landis

Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., (6th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d} 800; Lempco Products, Inc., v.
Simmons, (6th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 58. The Supreme Court's decision in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945), also lends support to the view that Mercoid reduced
to a shadow the doctrine of contributory infringement. The court allowed a patent on a
part of a combination on the ground that a patent on the whole combination would not
alone adequately protect tlie patentee.
22 Conmar Products v. Tibony, (E.D. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 372; Detroit Lubricator
v. Toussaint, (N.D. Ill. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 837; Hall v. Montgomery Ward, (N.D. W.Va.
1944) 57 F. Supp. 430; Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Metallizing Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1945)
62 F. Supp. 274. See also Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., (Del. 1945)
61 F. Supp. 767; Feinstein v. I.T.S. Co., (N.D. Ohio 1946) 69 U.S.P.Q. 405; Girdler Corp.
v. Dupont, (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 871; Johnson v. Atlas Mineral Products Co., (6th
Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 282; Amalgamated Dental Co. v. William Getz Corp., (N.D. Ill. 1951)
90 U.S.P.Q. 339.
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tion. He brings suit against contributory infringers who sell parts
of his combination to direct infringers.
This is probably the clearest case that could arise under section 271. In all probability the patentee would have been granted
relief prior to the Mercoid decision. After Mercoid, a California
district court intimated that the mere act of bringing suit against
a contributory infringer could be called misuse of the patent.23
The legislative history of section 271 shows that paragraph (d)
(3) is intended to overrule this decision. 24 The statutory language
clearly states that no patentee shall be deemed guilty of misuse because he has sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in D.B. Cole v. Hughes Tool Go.25
indicates that a patentee has little reason to fear that a court will
ignore the express terminology of section 271 (d) (3). While the
decision turned upon other grounds, the court specifically ruled
that the mere act of bringing suit could not constitute misuse. 26
B. The patentee derives all of his revenue from selling unpatented wares which are used with his patented invention. He
licenses only corporations which buy all of their unpatented wares
from him.
Prior to the enactment of section 271 (d) there is no doubt that
this patentee would have been deemed guilty of misuse. The facts
in this case are very similar to those in the Leitch and Mercoid
cases. In this type of case it seems quite clear that the patentee
uses his patent only for the purpose of increasing his sales of unpatented wares. Whether section 271 has given this right to the
patentee is one of the thorniest issues that can arise under the new
patent code. This problem was recently considered by the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Sola Electric Go. v.
General Electric Go. 21 The plaintiff had a patent on a combination
of unpatented elements to be used in an alternating current supply
system, but like the patentee in Mercoid, the plaintiff and his
licensees derived their income from sales of unpatented elements.
Licenses were granted to those who purchased the unpatented
elements from the plaintiff or his licensees. The court was able
Stroco Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, (S.D. Cal. 1944) 67 U.S.P.Q. 168.
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st sess.,
174 (1951).
25 (10th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 924.
26 Id. at 935.
21 (N.D. Ill. 1956) 111 U.S.P.Q. 203.
23
24
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to decide the case by finding that the patents in question were invalid. However, careful consideration was given to the effect of
section 271 (d) upon the doctrine of the Mercoid case. The court
was strongly inclined to believe that the plaintiff's conduct was
violative of the Mercoid doctrine, but found that section 271 (d)
had overruled the principles set down in Mercoid. The grounds
for this decision were stated succinctly:
"It seems to the court that the defendant's thesis above set
forth merely shows that the plaintiff has derived revenue from
acts which, if performed by another without plaintiff's consent,
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent,
that the plaintiff has licensed or authorized others to perform
acts which if performed without the plaintiff's consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent, and that
the plaintiff has sought to enforce its patent rights against infringement and contributory infringement. These acts are by
paragraph (d) of Section 271, above quoted, declared not to
be misuse of the patent right. The court holds, accordingly,
that the said Act of 1952 makes proper and lawful that which
under the doctrine of the Mercoid cases, above cited, would
have been misuse of the patent." 28
Nothing in the language or the legislative history of section
271 (d) compels this interpretation. Although some patent authorities stated to the House Judiciary Committee that section 271
would overrule Mercoid, there seems to have been no unanimity
among the legislators that such a result should take place. 29 Admittedly paragraph (d) (1) does exempt a patentee who is merely
deriving an income from the sale of component parts, but it does
not expressly deal with the patentee who refuses to license his
patent to those buying component parts from another seller. The
mere act of selling component parts is not the act which constitutes
28 Id. at 220.
29 Mr. Giles Rich,

one of the principal authors of the section, told the House Committee
on the Judiciary that the bill covered the Mercoid type of situation, but it is possible that
he was speaking of §271 (d) (2) which permits a patentee to license or authorize others to
sell component parts of a patented combination. Hearings before Committee on Judiciary
on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 178 (1951). A more positive statement by Mr. Rich
that the result in Mercoid would be changed by §271 (d) was made during the hearings
on an earlier bill containing substantially the same language. Hearings before Committee
on Judiciary on H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st sess., at 14 and 20 (1949). H. Rep. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d sess., 9, 28 (1952), and S. Rep. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 8, 28 (1952), merely
state that the section's purpose is "clarification and stabilization." There was no debate
on any part of the bill in the House of Representatives and the Senate debate throws
little new light on this question. Senator McCarran's statement mentions some changes
in the patent law, but does not deal specifically with the Mercoid situation. 98 CONG. R.Ec.
9323 (1952).
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misuse in this type of case. Coercion of potential licensees is the
factor which signals patent misuse.
In all probability paragraph (d) (1) was intended to protect
patentees from the misuse defense in a case where the patentee was
not guilty of trying to restrict cqmpetition in unpatented supplies
or parts. An excellent example of this type of case is seen in Hall
Laboratories, Inc. v. Springs Cotton Mills, Inc.,30 decided shortly
after the 1952 act became effective. The plaintiff had a patent
on a process which reduced the corrosion of water pipes by treating them with a mixture of metaphosphate and water. The plaintiff derived revenue from selling metaphosphate and also from
licensing his patent. There was no requirement that licensees buy
their supplies of metaphosphate from the plaintiff. Licenses were
granted to any person agreeing to a stipulated royalty. The court
·emphasized the absence of restrictive license provisions in finding
that the plaintiff was not guilty of misuse. Although the court did
not make any extensive reference to section 271, it is apparent that
the factors considered should be of importance in any case arising
under that section. This type of case is readily distinguished from
Leitch, Mercoid, and Sola. It does not involve an attempt to coerce
a licensee in areas beyond the scope of the patent grant. Absent
clear legislative intent to overrule Mercoid, it would seem probable
that section 271 (d) (I) was intended to deal with a case similar to
Hall Laboratories.81
C. The patentee is in the business of marketing a patented
system covered by its combination patent. Although the patentee
does not install the system for its customers, it designs the system,
furnishes instructions for installation, and guarantees its performance. Purchasers of the system are required to buy unpatented
component parts from the patentee.
In substance, these were the facts presented to the Second Circuit in Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc. 82 The patentee argued that the impact of section 271 (d) was to relieve a
patentee selling component parts of a combination from the stigma
of misuse. The court refused to rule on this point, basing its
so (W.D. S.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 29.
Crumpacker said of §271 (d), "It says that he shall not be deemed
guilty of misuse because he has done one of these three things. It doesn't say that he shall
be deemed not guilty of misuse because he has done this." Hearings before Committee on
Judiciary on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 167 (1951). See also the statements of Representative Rogers, ibid.
82 (D.C. Conn. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 123, affd. (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 370.
31 Representative

/
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decision upon the narrower ground that the sale of component
parts was incidental to the sale of the patented system as a whole.
Even though the system could be purchased only if the purchaser
obtained the unpatented parts from the patentee, and in spite of
the fact that the patentee's source of revenue was the unpatented
components and not the sale of the patented system as such, the
court held there was no misuse. The M ercoid decision was distinguished by virtue of the following factors:
"Although Fluid (the patentee), does not install or manufacture its oil transportation system, it does much more than
just sell unpatented components. Fluid designs the oil transportation system to meet the individualized needs of the customer; where necessary it designs and modifies the components
of the system according to its own specifications; instructions
are furnished for installation; the final installation is inspected
by Fluid; and a performance guarantee that a system will work
is given." 33
According to the factors heretofore considered by the courts in
determining patent misuse, it does not appear that the reason
given by Judge Medina for distinguishing the Mercoid case should
lead to the conclusion that there was no misuse. Unquestionably
the arrangement between the patentee and the customer was such
that the customer could not use the system without buying the
unpatented components from the patentee. By all recognized
standards there was misuse. While there may be sound policy
reason for this decision-in that it will encourage sellers of goods
to develop new inventions which will utilize their wares-it is
doubtful that a patentee can rely upon such a favorable result in
all courts. Until the courts reach a general agreement on the
question of whether section 271 (d) overrules the Mercoid result,
it would seem that a patentee would be well advised to avoid conditioning its licenses upon the purchase of component parts.

III.

The Doctrine of Contributory Infringement
Under Section 271 (b) and ( c)

It is generally supposed that section 271 (b) and (c) were intended to codify the doctrine of contributory infringement as it
existed prior to the Mercoid decision. Yet there is room for wide
33 Id. at 372. This decision may be interpreted as overruling Mercoid by implication.
For such an interpretation, see 66 YALE L.J. 132 at 137 (1956).
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disagreement as to the type of acts that will constitute contributory
infringement under section 271. For example, paragraph (c) states
that the mere sale of an unpatented staple, capable of substantial
non-infringing use, will not amount to contributory infringement.
Already there has been some degree of confusion as to the proper
interpretation of the terms "staple" and "substantial non-infringing use." Dicta in several cases has suggested that any unpatented
commodity may be regarded as a staple which is capable of noninfringing use. 34 There is nothing to indicate that any such interpretation was intended by Congress. It is to be hoped that such
language can be dismissed as an unfortunate ambiguity which is
likely to occur in the initial stages of interpretation of any statute.
A problem which promises to be of more lasting difficulty is
raised when a defendant sells staples which are capable of substantial non-infringing use and also provides directions to purchasers which will aid them to infringe the plaintiff's patent. Although a number of cases prior to Mercoid suggested that a patentee
could take action against such a defendant,35 it is unclear whether
such rights continue to exist under section 271. While it is certain that such conduct would not be actionable under paragraph
(c), there is a possibility that the prohibition against actively
inducing infringement in paragraph (b) would cover the situation.
As there is no indication of its coverage, the sanction in (b) against
one who "actively induces infringement" will support nearly any
interpretation.
The first case to deal with the scope of paragraph (b) was Jones
v. Radio Corporation of America.36 There the patentee sued a
defendant who imparted confidential information to potential infringers. As the defendant did not sell any component parts of the
patented combination, or supplies to be used with it, the plaintiff
could not rely upon paragraph (c) to support his contributory infringement action. The court held that the conduct of the defendant fell within the language of (b). The decision in this case
34 Gagnier Fibre Co. Products v. Fourslides, Inc., (E.D. Mich. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 926.
See Martin, "The Patent Codification Act," 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 625 at 639 (1954). Contra,
Southern States Equipment Corp. v. USCO Power Equipment Corp., (5th Cir. 1953) 209 F.
(2d) 111 at 121.
35 See Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Public Serv. Cup Co., (2d Cir. 1918) 250 F. 620;
Canada v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., (6th Cir. 1903) 124 F. 486; American Stainless
Steel Co. v. Ludlum Steel Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 823; Imperial Chemical Mfg. Co.
v. Stein, (S.D. N.Y. 1895) 69 F. 616, modified (2d Cir. 1896) 77 F. 612. However, it may
well be that the drafters of the bill felt that since the Carbice case, relief would be denied
to a patentee who had attempted to stop a seller dealing in unpatented goods.
36 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 131 F. Supp. 82.
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is important in two respects: (1) the court based the decision upon
the fact that section 271 (b) embraces all conduct, other than sales
of component parts, which had been contributory infringement
prior to the passage of section 271; (2) conduct which is not actionable under paragraph (c) may be actionable under (b). While the
court did not venture any opinion as to whether 271 (b) included
cases where the defendant sells articles which are capable of substantial non-infringing use, the reasoning of the case would seem
to point to the conclusion that such fact situations would be included.37
The courts have devoted little attention to the problem of the
defendant who sells staples capable of non-infringing use in the
few cases where it has been squarely presented. An example of this
treatment is Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D. Russell Co. Laboratories,38 where the plaintiff had a patent on a mixture of water
and a chemical called 3-Nitro. The chemical was apparently capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Both the patentee and the
defendant were engaged in selling the unpatented chemical with
instructions as to how it should be mixed with water. The patentee
sought to take advantage of section 271 (b) and (c) to enjoin the
defendant's activities. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit felt that the Carbice and Mercoid decisions had limited the
action of contributory infringement to cases where the defendant
was selling articles which could be used only for infringing purposes. The court assumed that these limitations were automatically
incorporated in paragraph (b) of section 27 I.
This problem was also ignored by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc. 39
The plaintiff, who was accused of contributory infringement, marketed component parts of the patentee's system which may have
been capable of a substantial non-infringing use. The district
court apparently assumed that these components were capable of
such a non-infringing use.40 Nevertheless, the patentee was allowed
37 If we assume that §271 (b) codifies the pre-Mercoid law of contributory infringement,
we would still have problems in determining whether the seller of a staple can be liable
for contributory infringement. There is a diversity of opinion on what the law was in regard to this question, prior to Mercoid. See note 35 supra.
38 (W'.D. Mo. 1953) 121 F. Supp. 709, affd. (8th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 414.
39 (D.C. Conn. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 123, affd. (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 370.
40 The findings of fact state, "For the most part the items that go to make up the
patented system such as the thermostat, transformer, insulated flanges, etc., are old and
unpatented although some are specially modified or designed for this purpose." Electric
Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., (D.C. Conn. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 123 at 125. The court
also found that the defendant had no intention of restraining any sale of parts except those
used to infringe its patent. Id. at 127.
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to protect himself against the plaintiff's sales. Whether the decision is based on the provisions of (b) or (c) is not clear from the
opinion. Similar ambiguity is found in the opinion of the court
of appeals. Judge Medina felt that the plaintiff made components
for special use in the defendant's system.41 It is not clear, however,.
whether he agreed with the district court's apparent assumption
that these products were capable of non-infringing use. The opinion is capable of three conflicting interpretations: (I) the court
ignored the problem of whether the article sold was capable of
substantial non-infringing use; (2) the court felt that while the
article sold was capable of non-infringing use, such use was not
"substantial" within the meaning of (c); or (3) the plaintiff was
guilty of actively inducing infringement of a patent under (b)
even though he sold an article capable of substantial non-infringing
uses.
It is difficult to draw a comprehensive rule from these confusing decisions. Nevertheless, it is clear from the legislative history
of section 271 (b) and (c) that a seller is not liable for the mere sale
of a staple which is capable of substantial non-infringing use. 42
Congress could hardly have intended to alter this result by allowing a patentee to sue a seller under (b) on the ground that the
mere sale of a staple actively induces infringement. On the other
hand, there is no indication that the draftsmen felt that (b) should
not operate where the vendor's actions go beyond the mere sale of
an article capable of a subs.tantial non-infringing use. In a case
where the defendant's advertisements suggest a method of infringing a patent, it would seem that the plaintiff should have a remedy
under (b). The mere fact that the defendant sells an article which
is capable of a substantial non-infringing use should not immunize
him from the force of (b).
41 Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., (2d Cir. 1956)
42 Bills were introduced in the 80th and 81st Congresses which

231 F. (2d) 370 at 372.
made this intent clear.
They contained sections substantially similar to paragraphs (b) and (d) of the present act.
The equivalent of paragraph (c) was contained in three separate para~phs, sections 2,
3, and 4. They stated: Section 2. "Any person who shall contribute to the infringement
of a patent in the manner set forth in section 3 shall be liable as an infringer. Section 3.
The sale of a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition . . . if especially made or adopted for use in an infringement of such patent, and
not suitable for actual commercial noninfringing use, shall constitute contributory infringement. Section 4. The mere sale of any staple article or commodity of commerce not
especially made or adapted for use in a patented invention, and suitable for actual commercial non-infringing use, shall not of itself constitute contributory infringement, even
though sold with the knowledge or expectation that it will be used in infringement of the
patent." Emphasis added. H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948); H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st
sess. (1949). Sections 3 and 4 were consolidated into §271 (c) with the unfortunate effect of
obscuring some of the meaning of the drafters.
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IV. Conclusion

A study of the cases which have been decided under section 271
would indicate that there are very few landmarks to aid a patentee
in choosing a sound licensing policy. To a large extent, the rights
of patentees under section 271 will depend upon the future course
of the judiciary. The decisions in the Sola and Fluid Systems cases
would seem to indicate that there is some trend toward an interpretation of section 271 which would overrule the misuse doctrine
as stated in the Mercoid decision. Such liberality is strongly reminiscent of the attitude of American courts prior to the Motion Picture Patents case. It is difficult to believe that future judicial opinions will support this trend. No such decisive trend has appeared
among the cases which have dealt with the scope of the contributory infringement doctrine under section 271 (b) and (c). In particular, it is difficult to tell whether the provisions of section 271 (b)
will be applied to prevent a seller of staples from inducing infringement. There is no strong policy reason to prevent such an
interpretation. The Fluid System decision is to be approved, to
the extent that it can be read to indorse this view. It is to be hoped
that courts in the future will allow contributory infringement
actions against those who actively induce infringement while selling products capable of non-infringing use. For the present time,
the patentee is in the position of awaiting a more definite trend of
judicial opinion to reinforce his rights in this area.

Robert W. Steele, S.Ed.

